# Natural Disasters and Neighborhood Choice: Evidence from Hurricane Harvey

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#### Abstract

The combination of climate change and economic growth in disaster-prone regions increasingly exposes the population to extreme weather events. While the aggregate impacts of disasters are well documented, much less is known about the individual responses to these environmental shocks. In this paper, I estimate the average treatment effects of household-level damage using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in the context of Hurricane Harvey, which damaged more than 200,000 homes in Houston, Texas in 2017. I leverage the relationship between flooding and a home's elevation, exploiting a discontinuous increase in damage from \$0 to approximately \$48,000 once water reaches the first floor. While residential mobility typically spikes after natural disasters, I find no evidence that flood damage causes homeowners to sell and move after Hurricane Harvey. If anything, damage decreases move propensity for multiple months. Although flooded households move at roughly the same rate as their non-flooded peers, I document a divergence in the location and type of housing selected by these movers. My results indicate that flood damage makes people more likely to move shorter distances and transition out of homeownership. Despite the combined shock to shelter and wealth, I find that flooded households are more likely to sort into higher-income census tracts in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Given the importance of place-based spillover effects, the long-run welfare implications of suffering flood damage remain an open area of research.

## 1 Introduction

The combination of climate change and economic growth in disaster-prone regions increasingly exposes the United States population to extreme weather events, with the number of inflation-adjusted billion-dollar natural disasters nearly doubling during the 2010s (NOAA, 2023). The immediate cost of natural disasters is driven by economic disruption and property damage (Smith and Katz, 2013). Housing is the primary asset for a majority of US households, making residential property damage a mixture of shelter and wealth shocks. While the aggregate impacts of disasters are well documented, much less is known about how individuals respond to this blended shock, particularly in terms of housing consumption.

Housing choices are central to individual wellbeing. For homeowners, the decision to remain in a home or to sell and move to a new location could impact access to certain labor markets, health care systems, or school districts for those with children. Movers must decide where to relocate, and the characteristics of their neighborhood may affect themselves or other members of their household through environmental or peer effects (Chyn and Katz, 2021). They must also decide whether to rent or purchase their new residence, an investment decision that may impact wealth creation and intergenerational mobility.

Isolating the causal effect of disaster damage is difficult due to the lack of administrative datasets detailing household-level exposure. Moreover, damage is endogenous to a variety of factors including individual risk preferences and mitigation measures as well as local investment in infrastructure and emergency preparations, and these correlates may introduce selection bias into estimates of average treatment effects on individual outcomes. The literature addresses these challenges by comparing outcomes of all individuals in a disaster-struck area with outcomes of observably similar individuals in unaffected places (Vigdor, 2008; Groen and Polivka, 2008; Deryugina et al., 2018). Another strand of the literature restricts analyses *within* a disaster area, relying on local variation in damage intensity to identify causal effects (Hartley and Gallagher, 2017; Bleemer and van der Klauww, 2019; Billings et al., 2022; Gallagher et al., 2023). These techniques, however, estimate the average treatment effect of living in damaged areas rather than the average treatment effect of damage itself.

In this paper, I estimate the average treatment effects of household-level damage using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in the context of Hurricane Harvey, which damaged more than 200,000 homes in Houston, Texas in 2017. I leverage the relationship between flooding and a home's elevation, exploiting a discontinuous increase in damage from \$0 to approximately \$48,000 once water reaches the first floor. I follow Dong and Kolesar (2023) and implement a donut design, allowing for valid inference despite measurement error in my running variable. To my knowledge, I offer the first causal estimates of household-level damage on individual outcomes.

I provide evidence of the hyper-local nature of disaster damage and response. In particular, I construct a household-level damage variable and exploit elevation differences between homes located in the same subdivision, finding substantial variation in damage exposure that causes a persistent divergence in outcomes. My household-level results bolster the findings in the literature that leverages aggregate damage as the level of treatment.

While residential mobility typically spikes after natural disasters, I find no evidence that flood damage causes homeowners to sell and move after Hurricane Harvey. If anything, damage decreases move propensity for multiple months after the storm. These effects differ from Billings et al. (2022) and

Gallagher et al. (2023), who document little difference in out-migration rates for Houstonians living in flooded or non-flooded census blocks. Their results, however, hint at heterogeneity across housing tenure, and homeowners on the margin of moving may delay that decision as they repair their homes. Moreover, post-disaster construction-labor shortages can prolong rebuilding efforts, and the full extent of disaster aid and insurance payments often takes months to materialize. The timing of these transfers may play an important role in residential mobility decisions.

Although flooded households move at roughly the same rate as their non-flooded peers, I document a divergence in the location and type of housing selected by these groups. My results indicate that flood damage makes people more likely to move shorter distances and transition out of homeownership during the five year post-storm period. In particular, I estimate that \$10,000 of damage causes a two mile decrease in relocation distance and a two percent decrease in homeownership. Housing choices diverge further when restricting the sample to movers, with an estimated 13 mile and 18 percent average decrease in move distance and homeownership, respectively.

The transition out of homeownership occurred during a period of substantial home-price appreciation in Houston, Texas, where the average price increased 42 percent between 2017 and 2022. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest more than \$100,000 of lost wealth for the average household who transitioned into renter occupancy because of flood damage.

The effects on homeownership are particularly striking given that home loans through the Small Business Administration (SBA) are the federal government's dominant form of individual-level assistance after natural disasters (Collier and Ellis, 2021). Billings et al. (2022) discuss the qualification hurdles for SBA loans and how their regressive allocation may limit their effectiveness to the marginal homeowner exposed to damage. This limitation may explain the damage-induced decrease in homeownership after Hurricane Harvey, but my results suggest that some flooded households may have upgraded their residential environment.

Despite the combined shock to shelter and wealth, I find that flooded households are more likely to sort into higher-income census tracts in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Conditional on moving, flood damage is associated with the consumption of newer and more expensive homes. This relative improvement in physical and socioeconomic environments mirrors the long-run recovery patterns documented in the disaster literature (Sacerdote, 2012; Deryugina et al., 2018; Deryugina and Molitor, 2020). Given the importance of place-based spillover effects, the long-run welfare implications of suffering flood damage remain an open area of research.

The rest of my paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the natural disaster literature and how individuals respond to environmental shocks. Section 3 offers an overview of Hurricane Harvey and introduces the area of Houston that I analyze. Section 4 summarizes the sources of data and the analytical sample. Section 5 presents my empirical strategy, and Section 6 explores the validity of my approach. The main results are provided in Section 7, and I summarize the overall contribution of this project in Section 8.

#### 2 Literature Review

Advances in quasi-experimental methods spurred a renaissance in the disaster literature that began with analyses of the victims of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina survivors suffered in the short run, but negative average effects dissipated over time across a range of outcomes, including mortality (Deryugina and Molitor, 2020), and employment and earnings (Vigdor, 2007; Groen and Polivka, 2008; Deryugina et

al., 2018). These papers all use some variation of a difference-in-differences framework, where the treatment group is a subset of individuals living in areas that were directly impacted by Hurricane Katrina and the control group consists of observably-similar individuals elsewhere in the United States. The estimands in these studies are generally interpreted as the average treatment effect of living in a disaster area, which reflects a weighted average across the spectrum of individual-level disaster exposure. For example, this weighted average includes the response of renter-occupied households as well as homeowners whose property may or may not have been damaged. This average treatment effect is particularly informative for evaluating community-wide impacts and recovery efforts across a region.

A parallel group of papers analyze the impacts of Hurricane Katrina by restricting comparisons of individuals living within the disaster area. Gallagher and Hartley (2017) leverage local flood variation in New Orleans and find that residents in the most flooded areas experienced short-term spikes in financial distress relative. Bleemer and van der Klaauw (2019) extend this analysis by examining how housing choices and household composition vary by census-block flood intensity. They find an immediate increase in move propensity that is persistently positive for more than a decade. Homeowners in New Orleans' inundated census blocks were 10 percentage points less likely to own a home by the end of the ten-year period.

More recently, a pair of papers has applied the census-block flood intensity approach to identify the impacts of Hurricane Harvey on individuals in Houston, Texas. Using hydrologic data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Billings et al. (2022) calculate the weighted average flood depth of developed land for each census block to explore differential responses to damage based on access to insurance and credit. They find no signs of systematic financial distress for households living in the 100-year floodplain, an area where flood insurance takeup rates are higher. Households who live in flooded census blocks outside of the 100-year floodplain experience disproportionate increases in delinquent debt and bankruptcy. The lack of flood insurance in these areas rely makes residents more reliant on disaster assistance, but the allocation of these transfers is regressive and fails to counteract initial inequalities in financial health. Gallagher et al. (2023) apply the same empirical strategy to analyze investment in human capital, finding a reduction of student loans for college-aged individuals living in flooded census blocks relative to their peers in other parts of Houston. These effects are prevalent in areas with higher levels of homeownership, suggesting a relationship between household-level damage and consumption and investment decisions.

The emphasis on census-block-level flooding illustrates the intuitive connection between disaster damage and individual responses. While all individuals in a disaster area may be indirectly impacted by the aggregate economic shock, the first-order concern for most disaster mitigation and relief efforts is to address the direct effects of these events. The identifying assumption of the flood-intensity approach relies on changes in outcomes of individuals in less-flooded census blocks providing a useful counterfactual to changes in outcomes for individuals in more-flooded census blocks (conditional on observable geospatial and socioeconomic factors). The literature supports this assumption by documenting the low explanatory power of pre-disaster census-block characteristics on flood intensity. The absence of correlation in aggregate data, however, does not imply individual-level exogeneity of flood exposure, and there may still be concerns of household selection across or within census blocks based on flood risk or unobservable factors.

While census blocks are the smallest geographic unit defined by the Census Bureau, they are typically delineated by physical features rather than by the characteristics of inhabitants. I contribute to this literature by restricting comparisons to people living in the same subdivisions, a locally-defined unit

that is more homogenous across individual-level characteristics.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, I leverage the quasi-random peak water level reached in these subdivisions during Hurricane Harvey, allowing for the identification of the average treatment effects of household-level disaster damage.

## 3 Hurricane Harvey and Houston Texas

Hurricane Harvey landed in Texas in August 2017, producing record-level rainfall that inundated more than 200,000 homes and caused \$125 billion in direct damage. Figure 1 illustrates the widespread flooding across the Houston metropolitan statistical area (MSA) by mapping the location of emergency rescue requests throughout the region.





Notes: The zoomed-in box displays the area surrounding the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs (shaded in dark gray). Source: New York Times (2017)

One of the major empirical challenges in the natural disaster literature is the endogeneity of damage. In the context of flooding, risk-averse individuals may select away from water sources or implement mitigation measures (e.g., the installation of flood vents). Others may value water as an amenity and prefer to live in close proximity to the natural resource, increasing their risk of flooding. Endogeneity concerns extend beyond individuals, as community-level infrastructure investment and maintenance are important determinants of local damage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Table 2 for a comparison of within-group variation of housing characteristics for subdivisions and census blocks.

The Addicks and Barker Reservoirs highlighted in Figure 1 serve as Houston's primary flood infrastructure, as their earthen dams prevent runoff from the Katy Prairie from inundating the city center during storms. The Army Corps of Engineers developed the reservoirs in the 1940s by constructing the dams and acquiring 25,000 acres of abutting land. This government-owned land is designed to temporarily detain rainfall and allow for controlled drainage eventually into the Gulf of Mexico (Furrh and Bedient, 2023).

Unlike lake-forming reservoirs, the government-owned land is perennially dry outside of extreme weather and is utilized as wooded parks, athletic fields, and other alternative uses, effectively masking its flood risk to surrounding suburbs. Moreover, the reservoirs are constructed as giant detention basins, creating a unique flooding mechanism that further distorts the salience of flood risk. While inland flood exposure typically depends on proximity to flowing water, Panel A of Figure 2 shows how the reservoirs create a pool based on a tub concept, where water rises uniformly with the basin irrespective of the location of water flow.

Figure 2: Flooding Mechanism

Panel A: General Tub Concept





Panel B: Addicks and Barker Reservoir Overview

Source: O'Neil (2020) and Bloom (2017).

Panel B illustrates how Hurricane Harvey's unprecedented rainfall filled the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, forcing water above the government-owned land for the first time and flooding thousands of homes. These homes lie outside of the 100-year floodplain, a classification that serves as the primary flood-risk signal in housing markets. I leverage the relatively unknown risk and unique flooding mechanism of the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs to circumvent selection issues that challenge the identification of causal effects of disaster damage on individual outcomes.

### 4 Data Sources and Sample Construction

I begin with the universe of owner-occupied housing units that were located in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds at the time of Hurricane Harvey.<sup>2</sup> Residential property data are obtained from the Harris and Fort Bend central appraisal districts and include the names of homeowners, occupancy status, property values, and physical housing characteristics (e.g., home size and year of construction).<sup>3</sup>

Table 1 summarizes these characteristics within the two watersheds, where there are roughly 100,000 homes distributed across 2,200 subdivisions. These homes were typically constructed in the mid-1990s, but homes in the Addicks Watershed tend to be smaller and lower-valued compared to homes in the Barker Watershed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Addicks and Barker Watersheds are contiguous watersheds in northwest Houston that both contains reservoirs with their respective names.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Portions of Waller County are located in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds, but these are mostly rural areas that lie well above the reservoirs.

Mean (Standard Deviation)	Addicks Watershed	Barker Watershed
Year of Construction	1995 (10)	1994 (11)
Square Feet	2230 (728)	2707 (952)
2017 Appraised Value	\$183,538 (82858)	\$288,806 (134241)
Estimated Damage	\$1,333 (13078)	\$6,681 (31556)
Maximum LiDAR Ground Elevation	1,520" (121)	1,431" (152)
Number of Subdivisions	1,637	852
Number of Owner-Occupied Homes	65,735	35,022

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Notes: Summary statistics of owner occupied single-family residential properties located in the Fort Bend and Harris County portions of the Addicks and Barker Watersheds.

#### **Measuring Disaster Damage**

Since no administrative datasets detail household-level damage during Hurricane Harvey, I approximate this magnitude using pre- and post-storm property values from the Harris and Fort Bend central appraisal districts. In particular, I calculate

(1) 
$$Damage_{j} = MarketValue_{j,2017} - MarketValue_{j,2018}$$

where  $MarketValue_{i,t}$  measures the market value of the structure of property *j* (not including land value) in year *t*. The 2017 values should not be influenced by Hurricane Harvey because those numbers were calculated and certified before the storm occurred.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand,  $MarketValue_{i,2018}$  estimates the value of property as of 01 January 2018, which was approximately four months after Hurricane Harvey. Consequently, Equation (1) reflects the change in property value due to disaster damage net of general home-price changes in 2017 and repairs that occurred before year-end. Summary statistics in Table 1 indicate average damage of \$1,333 and \$6,681 in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds, respectively, but the size of the standard deviations indicate substantial variation.

Although Texas' central appraisal districts are required to value property at 100% of its market value as of January 1st of each year, the lack of mandatory sales-price disclosure challenges the accuracy of these estimates. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that public appraisers have historically accessed sales data, and the accuracy of market values for typical homes in large subdivisions are less of a concern (Texas Tribune, 2014; City of Austin, 2020). Appendix A1 details the strong, positive relationship between my damage estimates and FEMA's estimates of flood depth, supporting the validity of this measure.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Some taxing jurisdictions allow for the reappraisal of property values after disasters. It is unclear if the central appraisal districts retroactively updated their certified tax rolls, and these updates would bias my damage estimates toward zero.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> As an alternative approach, I use FEMA's flood-depth estimates as the treatment variable, and results are provided in Appendix ?.

#### **Measuring Property Elevation**

My identification strategy outlined in Section 5 relies on using property-level elevation as the running variable in a regression discontinuity framework. In particular, properties are exposed to flood damage when water exceeds their first floor elevation (FFE), which I approximate using aerial light detection and ranging (LiDAR) data (TNRIS, 2022). Figure 3 presents the distribution of LiDAR points that measure the ground-surface elevation across three residential parcels.<sup>6</sup>



Figure 3: Property-Level Ground Elevation

Notes: Aerial LiDAR ground elevation points (measured in inches) for two residential properties in Oak Park Trails Subdivision in the Barker Reservoir. Property parcel shapefiles are available at the Harris and Fort Bend Central Appraisal Districts. Aerial LiDAR data are accessed from TNRIS (2022).

#### Outcomes

Given my analytical sample of owner-occupied households, I use deed transactions from CoreLogic's Owner Transfer dataset to determine if people sell their homes and move after Hurricane Harvey. I consider a household as having moved if a deed associated with their property is recorded after Harvey stalled over Houston on August 25th, 2017.<sup>7</sup> More than a quarter of the sample recorded a deed within five years of the storm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Based on conversations with housing developers, I assume that each property's FFE is equal to its maximum ground elevation. This approximation results in measurement error in my elevation running variable, and I explore the structure of this error in Appendix A2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> General and special warranty deeds are the most commonly used deeds in Texas and account for more than 90 percent of the residential records in the CoreLogic data.

After measuring homeselling and mobility, I track the set of movers to their post-storm residence using a nationwide database of address histories from Infutor Data Solutions, an aggregator of address data that compiles voter files, property deeds, USPS address changes, etc. Appendix A3 details the steps of my linking process. The linked dataset allows me to observe movers' residential decisions after Hurricane Harvey. Specifically, I analyze how flood damage impacts the distance moved from pre-storm address as well as the housing tenure and characteristics of their post-storm residence. I also examine the socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., average household income) of movers' post-storm census tracts.

## 5 Empirical Framework

The idiosyncrasies of Houston's reservoirs described in Section 3 offer a unique setting to identify the causal effects of disaster damage. My empirical strategy involves the comparison of outcomes for households in the same subdivision who live just above and just below the peak water level reached in the reservoirs during Hurricane Harvey. The US Army Corps of Engineers (2020) report that the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs reached peaks of 1309.2 and 1219.2 inches above mean sea level, respectively, which I use as thresholds in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.

Consider a theoretical experiment where identical homes are randomly assigned different "doses" of flooding. The average treatment effect of dose *d* could be estimated by the difference between mean outcomes for those treated with *d* and non-flooded households.<sup>8</sup> Flood exposure, however, is a nonrandom event at a hyper-localized level due in part to individuals' mitigation measures (e.g., the installation of flood walls or flood vents), community development decisions (e.g., drainage infrastructure), and atmospheric and topographic variation. Table 2 documents heterogeneity in property characteristics across a range of geospatial units in my sample.<sup>9</sup> Properties are relatively homogenous within subdivisions, but there remains variation in the value and size of homes as well as in elevation. Elevation (and therefore flood risk) correlates with the value, size, age, and other (potentially unobservable) property characteristics that may also be related to outcomes, introducing omitted variable bias into point estimates.

Group Level (Number of Groups)	Market Value (2010-2016)	Home Size	Year Built	Maximum Ground Elevation (Inches)
Watershed (2)	\$101,034	812sqft	10.7	138"
Zip Code (10)	\$81,951	753sqft	9.5	78"
Census Block (3101)	\$31,026	445sqft	2.6	11"
Subdivisions (2196)	\$20,865	383sqft	1.6	10"

Table 2: Average (Within-Group) Standard Deviation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The *average treatment effect* at dose *d* describes the level effect of the dose-response relationship. Alternatively, the slope effect captures *average causal response* to an incremental change in the dose at *d* (Callaway et al., 2021). <sup>9</sup> For example, the standard deviation of home size is 729sqft and 895sqft in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds,

respectively, and the average of 812sqft across the two watersheds. The averages are similar when weighted by the number of properties in each group.

Notes: Each row contains averages of within-group standard deviations at progressively smaller levels. For example, the standard deviation of home size is 729sqft and 895sqft in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds, respectively, and the average is 812sqft across the two watersheds. Averages are similar when weighted by the number of properties in each group.

I address this concern by analyzing properties at elevations near the peak water level that was reached in the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. Property and household characteristics, as well as potential outcomes, should be smooth as you rise in elevation through the peak water level because Hurricane Harvey's precise magnitude was unknown *a priori*. Households could not predict the peak water level when making residential-sorting decisions months or years before the storm. The only difference between homes slightly above and below this level should be flood exposure. This setting approximates a local randomized experiment, where quasi-identical distributions of homes receive different damage doses.

My identification strategy exploits the fact that the intensity of flood damage decreases with a property's elevation up to the peak water level. For example, National Flood Services LLC estimates approximately \$37,000 in structural damage for a 2,500sqft, one-story home that is exposed to six inches of water compared to \$24,000 in damage for the same home exposed to a single inch. No damage is expected for homes lying above water (FloodSmart, 2019). While the hydrology literature documents several types of flood damage functions, a common characterization is a discontinuous increase in damage at the first floor elevation (Theodosopoulou et al., 2022). Figure 4 illustrates a simple piecewise linear damage function with a discontinuity where the first floor elevation equals the peak water level.

Figure 4: Theoretical Damage Function



Notes: The running variable is the difference between the peak water level and property j's first floor elevation. For example, a property whose first floor elevation is one foot below the peak water level has a running variable  $r_i = 12$ .

I formalize this approach to estimate the average treatment effects of damage by using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where the expected damage function jumps discontinuously at the peak

water level. I include subdivision fixed effects to restrict comparisons to individuals who live in observably-equivalent homes but on different sides of the peak water level.

As mentioned in Section 4, I approximate each property's first floor elevation with its maximum ground elevation, admittedly using a running variable with measurement error.<sup>10</sup> Following Dong and Kolesar (2023), I implement a donut design to allow for valid inference despite mismeasured elevation. The donut solution requires two key assumptions. First, potential outcomes must be smooth in the mismeasured variable, which may hold mechanically as measurement error in the running variable tends to smooth conditional expectation functions. To illustrate this phenomenon in my context, I simulate a \$20,000 damage discontinuity as a function property elevation, comparing measurements with and without 12-inches of elevation error. Panel A of Figure 5 reveals how measurement error distorts the true discontinuity by smoothing the conditional expectation function.

The second assumption requires that the mismeasured running variable correctly classifies treatment assignment. The simulated measurement error on the right side of Panel A, however, illustrates how some undamaged (damaged) homes are misclassified below (above) the peak water level. Removing misclassified observations resolves the measurement-error issue. Panel B illustrates the effectiveness of a 12-inch donut in the presence of 12 inches of measurement error. Note that the standard challenges of donut trimming apply in this context (e.g., lost sample size and a modified local average treatment effect).

Figure 5: Simulated Damage Function





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Dong and Kolesar (2023) find that nearly a quarter of regression discontinuity designs that are published in top economics journals suffer from this threat to identification. Their proposed donut solution provides for valid inference for the local average treatment effect of units with values of the *mismeasured* running variable near the true threshold. In contrast, the canonical regression-discontinuity framework that estimates the local average treatment effect of units with values of the *same* threshold.



Notes: Figure 5 plots the average damage at each elevation inch for simulated data with a \$20,000 discontinuity at r = 0. The left sides of Panels A and B illustrate the mean plots in the presence of accurate elevation data. The right sides of Panels A and B illustrate the mean plots in the presence of 24 inches of measurement error (12 inches above and below the true value). Panel B depicts dashed lines at  $\pm 12$  inches, revealing how sample trimming can remove the measurement-error distortion of the conditional mean plots.

To implement the donut fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I start by estimating the discontinuity in damage around the peak water levels reached in the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. I standardize the running variable by subtracting property *j*'s maximum ground elevation from the peak water level of the reservoir in which *j* is located, resulting in a measure of the relative inches below the threshold. The estimating equation of the first stage is

(2) 
$$Damage_{j} = \alpha_{n} + \gamma r_{j} + \beta 1\{r_{j} \ge 0\} + \psi r_{j} 1\{r_{j} \ge 0\} + \xi_{i} \text{ for } r \in [h_{l}, h_{l}^{donut}] \cup [h_{r}^{donut}, h_{r}],$$

where *Damage* is determined by Equation (1),  $\alpha_n$  represent subdivision-level fixed effects, r is the standardized running variable,  $1\{r_i \ge 0\}$  is an indicator equaling 1 if j lies below the peak water level,  $h_l$  and  $h_r$  are the left- and right-sided bandwidths, respectively, and  $h_l^{donut}$  and  $h_r^{donut}$  are the left- and right-side bandwidths, respectively, and  $h_l^{donut}$  and  $h_r^{donut}$  are the left- and right-side bandwidths.

There are two primary motivations for the fuzzy component of the model. First, the magnitude of damage depends on the volume of water exposure to a home. The fuzzy design allows for causal identification of average treatment effects in the presence of different treatment intensities. Second, the probability of damage is non-binary across elevation because of other idiosyncrasies and determinants of flooding, i.e., there exists subsets of the population whose damage was not determined by their elevation relative to the peak water level. The fuzzy design allows for the identification of the local average treatment effect of the households who flooded because of this relative elevation (i.e., the "compliers").

The reduced-form regression equation illustrates how elevation is used to estimate the effects of flood shocks on outcomes. Specifically, the reduced-form equation is

(3) 
$$Y_j = \alpha_n + \pi r_j + \lambda 1\{r_j \ge 0\} + \phi r_j 1\{r_j \ge 0\} + \eta_j r \in [h_l, h_l^{donut}] \cup [h_r^{donut}, h_r],$$

where *Y* is the outcome of interest. Note that the parameter  $\lambda$  is the local average treatment effect of living below the peak water level (or the intention-to-treat effect). The local average treatment effect of flood damage can be recovered by scaling  $\lambda$  by the parameter  $\beta$  from the first stage.

The causal interpretation of these parameters (and their ratio) relies on three key identifying assumptions in my setting. First, there must exist a relationship between a property's maximum ground elevation and flood damage that changes as you approach the edges of the donut surrounding the peak water level. Second, maximum ground elevation must accurately assign instances where flood damage occurred. Third, the exclusion restriction requires potential outcomes to be smooth through the peak water level and for the peak water level to affect outcomes *only through* its impact on flood damage. I evaluate these assumptions in the following section.

#### 6 Empirical Validation

I begin by exploring the damage-elevation relationship in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds that is specified in Equation (2). Figure 6 reveals a smooth curve similar to the simulation results with measurement error. There are fewer observations to the right of the threshold because the reservoirs' peak water levels only extended about three feet above the government-owned land and into neighborhoods.<sup>11</sup>



Figure 6: First Stage

Notes: The regression estimates and lines are based on Equation (2), a local linear regression with rectangular kernels and a preferred bandwidth of [-120.0,-18.7] and [6.6,36.0]. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The scatterplots are generated by rounding elevation to the nearest inch and estimating a subdivision fixed effects model saturated in 1-inch elevation dummy variables. The sample mean of the outcome variable is added back to the coefficient estimates for illustrative purposes. The red lines correspond to the preferred sample trimming at -18.7 and 6.6 inches below the peak water level.

Based on the measurement error structure explored in Appendix A2, I trim the sample from -18.7 to 6.6 inches to ensure accurate assignment of flood damage by the ground elevation variable. Using this donut design, I estimate an average increase of \$47,795 in flood damage for homes lying just below the peak water level. Robustness tests in the Appendix corroborate the stability of my estimates at different donut sizes and bandwidths.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> An additional asymmetry appears around the threshold because of the right-skewness of elevation measurement error that is discussed in Appendix A2.

The third identifying assumption requires potential outcomes to be smooth through the peak water level and for the peak water level to affect outcomes only through flood damage. While this is inherently untestable, I provide support for this claim by documenting a relatively constant relationship between the elevation and pre-storm property characteristics on both sides of the peak water level. Figure 7 illustrates the similarity in housing characteristics above and below the peak water level, which is unsurprising as Harvey's precise magnitude was unpredictable when households moved into these neighborhoods. The lack of pre-storm patterns supports the assumption that a property's relative distance to the peak water level only affected households through the impact of flood damage.





Notes: Panels A and B replace the outcome in Equation (2) with the property's year of construction and structure square footage, respectively. Equation (2), a local linear regression with rectangular kernels and a preferred bandwidth of [-120.0,-18.7] and [6.6,36.0]. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The scatterplots are generated by rounding elevation to the nearest inch and estimating a subdivision fixed effects model saturated in 1-inch elevation dummy variables. The sample mean of the outcome variable is added back to the coefficient estimates for illustrative purposes. The red lines correspond to the preferred sample trimming at -18.7 and 6.6 inches below the peak water level.

#### 7 Results

Natural disasters are associated with spikes in out-migration that slowly attenuate over multiple years (Boustan et al., 2020). Billings et al. (2022) document an immediate increase in residential mobility after Hurricane Harvey but find no connection between those movements and census-block flood intensity.

My results presented in Figure 8, however, indicate that household-level flood damage does not cause the initial wave of out migration. I estimate that \$10,000 of damage decreases homeowners' propensity to sell by year-end 2017 by 0.5 percentage points, a 23 percent decline relative to their non-flooded neighbors who lived just above the peak water level. There is no discernable impact on move propensity in 2018.

Panel B details the cumulative effects of \$10,000 of damage on moving in each month through September 2022. The cumulative effect starts attenuating near the end of 2018 and hovers around zero for most the post-Harvey period. The treatment-effect dynamics suggest that flood damage temporarily delayed relocation decisions, but there was ultimately no clear impact on move propensity in the long run. The difference between this pattern and that generally observed in the literature may be because my sample consists exclusively of homeowners rather than renter households. Homeowners on the margin of moving may choose to repair their property before relocating, and many flooded households were forced to wait months after Hurricane Harvey for full disbursement of disaster aid or insurance payments to help fund this investment.





Panel A: Residential Mobility in 2017 and 2018



#### Panel B: Cumulative Effects Over Time

Notes: The point estimate  $\hat{\theta}$  is the the estimated causal effect of \$10,000 of damage, reflecting the ratio of the reduced form effect  $\hat{\lambda}$  from Equation (3) and the first stage effect  $\hat{\beta}$  from Equation (2). The left side of Panel A is based on an indicator for property *j* having a deed recorded between September 2017 and December 2017. The right side of Panel A similarly uses an indicator for a deed recorded any time in 2018. The regression estimates and lines are based on Equation (3), a local linear regression with rectangular kernels and a preferred bandwidth of [-120.0,-18.7] and [6.6,36.0]. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The scatterplots are generated by rounding elevation to the nearest inch and estimating a subdivision fixed effects model saturated in 1-inch elevation dummy variables. The sample mean of the outcome variable is added back to the coefficient estimates for illustrative purposes. The red lines correspond to the preferred sample trimming at -18.7 and 6.6 inches below the peak water level. Panel B plots the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals using a cumulative outcome variable for each post-storm month. For example, the estimates for September 2018 are based on an outcome variable for whether a property had a deed recorded any time between September 2017 and September 2018. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

While the effect on households' decision to move evolves over time and eventually attenuates, I document a persistent impact on how and where household relocate. Figure 9 illustrates the impact of \$10,000 of flood damage on the probability of households renting their next residence. The relatively small point estimate in Panel A is driven by the fact that more than two-thirds of the analytical sample did not move from their pre-storm address by 2022. Conditioning on the set of movers in Panel B reveals a large transition out of owner occupancy. In particular, \$10,000 of damage makes households 6 percentage points (or 18 percent) more likely to rent their next residence compared to their non-flooded peers.



Figure 9: Estimated Average Treatment Effect on Renting

Notes: I consider an individual as a post-storm renter if they sold their home after Hurricane Harvey and did not appear in appraisal-district data at their new address before 2022. I am currently only able to match post-storm movers to appraisal district data in Harris and Fort Bend County, accounting for two-thirds of movers. If movers relocated away from those counties, they are considered to be renters. The left side of Panel A

uses the full sample including homeowners who do not sell after Hurricane Harvey. The right side of Panel B restricts the sample to movers. The point estimate  $\hat{\theta}$  is the the estimated causal effect of \$10,000 of damage, reflecting the ratio of the reduced form effect  $\hat{\lambda}$  from Equation (3) and the first stage effect  $\hat{\beta}$  from Equation (2). The regression estimates and lines are based on Equation (3), a local linear regression with rectangular kernels and a preferred bandwidth of [-120.0,-18.7] and [6.6,36.0]. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The scatterplots are generated by rounding elevation to the nearest inch and estimating a subdivision fixed effects model saturated in 1-inch elevation dummy variables. The sample mean of the outcome variable is added back to the coefficient estimates for illustrative purposes. The red lines correspond to the preferred sample trimming at -18.7 and 6.6 inches below the peak water level.

The impact of flood damage extends to the types of neighborhoods and homes where individuals choose to live. Results in Figure 10 indicate that flood damage decreases the distance between movers' pre- and post-storm residences, but impacted households tend to sort into higher-valued homes and higher-income neighborhoods.

Figure 10: Estimated Average Treatment Effect on Neighborhood and Home Choice for Movers



Panel B: Post-Storm Home Values (2020)



Panel A: Distance Moved





Notes: Figure 10 restricts the sample to individuals who sold their home after Hurricane Harvey and who have a post-storm address in the Infutor data. Panels A and C include movers who relocated across the United States, while Panel B considers only those who relocated within Harris and Fort Bend County, as I am only able to match post-storm movers to appraisal district data in Harris and Fort Bend County. The point estimate  $\hat{\theta}$  is the the estimated causal effect of \$10,000 of damage, reflecting the ratio of the reduced form effect  $\hat{\lambda}$  from Equation (3) and the first stage effect  $\hat{\beta}$  from Equation (2). The regression estimates and lines are based on Equation (3), a local linear regression with rectangular kernels and a preferred bandwidth of [-120.0,-18.7] and [6.6,36.0]. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The scatterplots are generated by rounding elevation to the nearest inch and estimating a subdivision fixed effects model saturated in 1-inch elevation dummy variables. The sample mean of the outcome variable is added back to the coefficient estimates for illustrative purposes. The red lines correspond to the preferred sample trimming at -18.7 and 6.6 inches below the peak water level.

#### 8 Conclusion

The natural disaster literature has documented a dynamic recovery process acros a variety of outcomes for individuals living in disaster-struck areas. I contribute to this literature by using property-level damage data in a quasi-experimental empirical strategy to estimate the average treatment effect of household damage exposure on residential mobility and housing choices after Hurricane Harvey. I leverage the relatively unknown risk and unique flooding mechanism of Houston's Addicks and Barker Reservoirs to circumvent selection issues that challenge the identification of causal effects of disaster damage. I overcome measurement error in the elevation running variable by sample trimming, resulting in a donut regression discontinuity design. I examine the relationship between flooding and a home's elevation, exploiting a discontinuous increase in damage from \$0 to approximately \$48,000 once water reaches the first floor. The results from this first stage are used to rescale reduced-form estimates of the impact of \$10,000 of flood damage on residential mobility and housing outcomes.

I reject the notion that disaster damage explains the spike in out-migration for homeowners. These findings differ from Billings et al. (2022) and Gallagher et al. (2023), who document little difference in out-migration rates for Houstonians living in flooded or non-flooded census blocks. Their results, however, hint at heterogeneity across housing tenure, and their sample includes renter households.

Although flooded homeowners move at roughly the same rate as their non-flooded peers, I document a divergence in the choices made by those who decide to relocate. My results indicate that flood damage makes people more likely to move shorter distances and transition out of homeownership. In particular, I estimate that \$10,000 of damage causes a two mile decrease in relocation distance and a two percent decrease in homeownership. Housing choices diverge further when restricting the sample to

movers, with an estimated 13 mile and 18 percent average decrease in move distance and homeownership, respectively.

Despite the combined shock to shelter and wealth, I find that flooded households are more likely to sort into higher-income census tracts in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. This relative improvement in physical and socioeconomic environments mirrors the long-run recovery patterns documented in the disaster literature (Sacerdote, 2012; Deryugina et al., 2018; Deryugina and Molitor, 2020). Since disaster damage pushes people out of their neighborhoods and into new economic environments, the impacts of extreme weather may extend into other aspects of life. These neighborhood effects may augment or offset the transition into different types of housing or housing tenure.

The totality of my results raise important questions about the effectiveness of disaster aid. On the one hand, the muted residential mobility response may indicate that SBA loans are preventing people from losing their homes after catastrophic events. On the other hand, disaster damage net of relief efforts led to a substantial transition out of homeownership and into renter occupancy. The normative implications of this transition are unclear, especially as flooded households tend to relocate into higher income neighborhoods that may offer improved economic opportunities.

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# Appendix A1: FEMA Flood Depth and Damage Estimates

Immediately after Hurricane Harvey, FEMA began modeling flood depths (i.e., the difference between water elevation and ground elevation) across the disaster zone. FEMA's flood-depth data are based on a variety of sources including observed water levels at stream gauges, remote sensing, and other inspection data. These data are intended to be used for determining damage levels on specific structures (FEMA, 2018).

Figure A1 presents the relationship between three measures of property-level flood depth and my estimates of flood damage in the Addicks and Barker Watersheds. FEMA's model does not capture flood depths below 12 inches, resulting in left-censored data grouped at zero inches. Properties where the minimum flood depth is approximately 12 inches average almost \$10,000 of damage. All three flood-depth metrics are positively related to my damage estimates.





## Appendix A2: Measurement Error in Elevation

One of the implications of the intra-parcel elevation variation is that I may not observe the true FFE. Based on conversations with housing developers, I assume that each property's FFE is equal to its maximum ground elevation. In order to explore the error structure of this approximation, I obtain validation data generated by mobile (rather than aerial) LiDAR technology that measures the elevation of the base of each home's front door (Cyclomedia, 2020). There is minimal overlap between the validation data and my analytical sample, but I am able to compare the maximum ground elevation and base-of-door elevations for 13,000 homes in other parts of Houston.

Figure A2 displays the distribution of deviations between the two measures. The maximum ground elevation tends to be higher than the base of the front door, resulting in positive skewness. Variation in landscaping, natural land gradients, and instrument imprecision likely explain this overestimation. The maximum ground elevation, however, is highly predictive of base-of-door elevation, with a 0.99 correlation coefficient and a majority of errors lying within seven inches. I use this error structure to refine my empirical strategy in Section 5.



Figure A2: Elevation Data Deviations

In order to satisfy the second identifying assumption outlined in Section 4, the mismeasured elevation must correctly classify when properties are damaged. In an ideal setting, I would delete observations whose maximum ground elevation lies within the support of measurement error estimated from the validation data. This support, however, extends from -30 to 48 inches, thereby removing my entire sample right of the threshold. I opt for a tighter trimming that spans 80 percent of the error support but maintains two-thirds of my sample right of the threshold.

# Appendix A3: Data Linking

In Step 1 I link more than 17,000 movers (57 percent) to the Infutor data based on an exact match of their names and addresses at the time of Hurricane Harvey. The imperfect match rate is likely driven by lack of standardization of names and addresses across data sources. For example, the use of a middle initial rather than a middle name would result in a failure to match.

Figure A3: Linking Central Appraisal District Data to Infutor

Movers	Jaro-Winkler Scores	Infutor
James D. Jones	1.0	James D. Jones
122 Main St	1.0	122 Main St
	2.0	
Jane Sue Doe	0.91	Jane Doe
456 W. Magill Ave	0.93	456 West Magill Avenue
	1.84	
Jerry Smith	0.39	Smith Jerry
789 Meadowland Blvd	1.0	789 Meadowland Blvd
	1.39	
Eric Lee	1.0	Eric Lee
321 Sunny Lane	1.0	321 Sunny Lane
	2.0	
Step 2: Identify Hi	gh-Quality Unmatc	hed Movers
Movers	Jaro-Winkler Scores	Infutor
Jane Sue Doe	0.91	Jane Doe
45.6344 84 2014	0.00	C 147 - 1 8 4 - 11 4

#### Step 1: Identify Exact Matches

Movers	Jaro-Winkler Scores	Infutor
Jane Sue Doe	0.91	Jane Doe
456 W. Magill Ave	0.93	456 West Magill Avenue
	1.84	
Jerry Smith	0.39	Smith Jerry
789 Meadowland Blvd	1.0	789 Meadowland Blvd
	1.39	

I allow for more flexible matching in Step 2 using the Jaro-Winkler string-distance algorithm, which scores the similarity of strings between 0 and 1 for no similarity and exact matches, respectively. Since I link movers based on both names and addresses, the combined Jaro-Winkler score ranges from 0 to 2. I consider combined scores above 1.8 to be extremely accurate, and the inclusion of these high-quality matches increases the number of movers whom I observe to 22,901 (77 percent).

I extend the analysis further by analyzing how movers' housing consumption differs between their pre- and post-storm addresses. Specifically, I take the movers who matched to Infutor, and I match them a second time based on their post-storm address to CAD data across Texas obtained from CoreLogic.<sup>12</sup> This second phase of matching repeats the methodology used in the first phase, considering only matches with at least a 1.9 combined Jaro-Winkler score. I successfully match more than 3,000 movers across Texas, all of whom maintained owner occupancy despite selling their pre-Harvey home.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> I do not have access to CoreLogic's national data, preventing me from linking out-of-state movers' to their post-storm addresses.

Note that if a mover transitions out of owner occupancy, they cannot be accurately matched in the second phase because they do not own their post-storm residence. Consequently, I perform an exact match based solely on post-storm addresses to the statewide CAD data to learn more about the housing consumption of households who transitioned into renter occupancy.

# Appendix 4: Additional Outcomes and Robustness Checks

The Owner Transfer dataset also contains information on foreclosures, an outcome indicative of financial distress and hardship.<sup>13</sup> Foreclosures are a relatively rare event, with an average of 6 foreclosures per hundred households in Houston between 2010 and 2016.

Foreclosures offer an alternative (yet infrequent) mobility outcome that may be particularly sensitive to physical property damage. Homeowners faced with repair costs may default on mortgage payments if budget constraints are binding, and policymakers recognize this threat by often implementing foreclosure moratoria in the aftermath of a disaster. Appendix Table ? provides results for the impact of damage on foreclosures, where I find tightly estimated null effects through 2017 when the moratorium was effective. The 95 percent confidence intervals encompass zero throughout the post-Harvey period, but there are signs of a temporary spike in the summer of 2018, when the first Harvey-related foreclosure proceedings occurred. This potential uptick was short lived, and point estimates hover below zero through the remainder of the analytical period. Importantly, my outcome only accounts for foreclosures of a homeowner's pre-storm address, but damaged households may experience differential risk of foreclosing on their next residence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> I use a broader definition of foreclosure that includes foreclosure deeds, deeds of trust that specify foreclosure, as well as deeds in lieu of foreclosure, the latter of which is colloquially known as a "friendly foreclosure."